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We investigate quantum state discrimination with confidentiality. N observers share a given
quantum state belonging to a finite set of known states. The observers want to determine the state
as accurately as possible and send a discrimination result to a receiver. However, the observers are
not allowed to get any information about which state was given. N − 1 or fewer observers might
try to steal the information, but if N observers coexist, the honest ones will keep the dishonest
ones from doing anything wrong. Assume that the state set has a certain symmetry, or more
precisely, is Abelian geometrically uniform (AGU). We propose a protocol that realizes any optimal
inconclusive measurement, which is a generalized version of a minimum-error measurement and
an optimal unambiguous measurement, for any AGU state set and ensures that any combined
state of N − 1 or fewer observers has absolutely no information about the given state. Our protocol
provides a method of performing a quantummeasurement securely, which could be useful in quantum
information applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose that a sender wants to send a classical mes-
sage to a receiver in the harsh environment, such as deep
space, but they cannot communicate directly. Thus, the
sender sends the message to a third party, called an ob-
server, and the observer sends it to the receiver. Consider
that the observer receives a quantum state ρm belong-
ing to a set of known quantum states, ρ0, ρ1, · · · , ρM−1,
which are mutually non-orthogonal. The observer per-
forms a quantum measurement on ρm and sends its result
to the receiver using classical communication. However,
the message is highly private and/or sensitive (e.g., a
classified message), and so the observer is not allowed to
get any information about m. What can the observer
do to send as precise information about m as possible to
the receiver while ensuring that the observer obtains no
information?
We will show that it is possible to do this when two
or more observers exist and at least one of them is hon-
est. For simplicity, consider that there are two observers,
Alice and Bob, and they receive the state ρm. We as-
sume that Alice or Bob might try to steal the informa-
tion about m by illegal means, but if they coexist, the
honest one will keep the dishonest one from doing any-
thing wrong. We propose a protocol where they tells a
discrimination result to the receiver, Charlie, while en-
suring that absolutely no information is leaked to Alice
or Bob. Let us explain our protocol using Fig. 1. Alice
and Bob first transform a given state ρm into ρ
′
m as a
preprocessing step, where ρ′m is a (generally entangled)
state of their composite system. In this step, they cannot
perform a wrong or evil action since they coexist. They
next independently measure their individual systems. In
L
Π(A)
Π(B)
Alice&Bob Bob
Alice
m
ρ
m
ρ ′
Alice's result
Bob's result
FIG. 1. Data flow for a bipartite secure measurement.
this step, a dishonest observer may try to extract infor-
mation about m. They tell their outcomes to Charlie via
classical communication. This classical communication
is encrypted to ensure that neither Alice nor Bob learns
the classical data that the other one transmits. Charlie
finally determines m from their outcomes. We refer to
such a measurement as a bipartite secure measurement if
neither Alice nor Bob obtains any information about m
even if they act dishonestly in their individual measure-
ments.
As is well known, non-orthogonal states cannot be per-
fectly distinguished; thus, we want to find a measurement
that performs best in a certain strategy. In one strat-
egy, a measurement that maximizes the average correct
probability [1–3], denoted by a minimum-error measure-
ment, has been investigated [4–8]. In another strategy, a
measurement that achieves unambiguous, i.e., error-free,
discrimination with the minimum average failure proba-
bility [9–11], denoted by an optimal unambiguous mea-
surement, has also been studied [12–15]. Recently, as a
more general measurement, a measurement that maxi-
mizes the average correct probability with a fixed aver-
age failure probability, which we refer to as an optimal
2inconclusive measurement (OIM), has been investigated
[16, 17]. Minimum-error measurements and optimal un-
ambiguous measurements can be interpreted as special
cases of OIMs.
Remarkably, we show that any OIM, with any average
failure probability, for the state set {ρm} can be real-
ized with a bipartite secure measurement if {ρm} has
certain symmetry properties, or more precisely, if it is
a (not necessarily pure) Abelian geometrically uniform
(AGU) state set [18, 19]. Such a state set is a broad
class of quantum state sets, including phase shift keyed
state sets, pulse position modulated state sets, and linear
codes with binary letter-states [20–22]. We also investi-
gate the multipartite case and derive that a multipartite
secure measurement can realize any OIM if {ρm} is an
AGU state set. For simplicity, throughout the main body
of the paper we consider only three linearly independent
cyclic pure states. In Appendix A, we will extend our
technique to AGU states.
Although our scheme and secret sharing might seem
somewhat similar, they are quite different. In classical se-
cret sharing [23, 24], a classical, i.e., perfectly distinguish-
able, secret is split among several parties. In addition, a
method for sharing an arbitrary unknown quantum state
has been proposed [25], which provides a quantum ver-
sion of secret sharing. In such schemes, the parties share
a classical or quantum state, which can be perfectly re-
constructed when a sufficient number of parties cooper-
ate. In contrast, in a bipartite secure measurement, the
observers share a classical message encoded in quantum
states that are not perfectly distinguishable, i.e., a given
quantum state cannot be perfectly reconstructed from
the measurement outcome. Moreover, in our scenario,
the observers cannot communicate with each other after
preprocessing. Our scheme provides a method for opti-
mally discriminating between quantum states with con-
fidentiality using the basic idea of secret sharing, though
our technique is drastically different from that of secret
sharing. Note that combining quantum cryptography
with classical secret sharing to protect against eavesdrop-
ping has also been proposed [26].
II. FORMULATION
Let us consider discrimination between M quantum
states represented by density operators ρm (m ∈ IM )
with prior probabilities ξm, where Ik = {0, 1, · · · , k− 1}.
ρm is positive semidefinite and has unit trace. In this
paper, we assume equal probabilities ξm = 1/M for any
m ∈ IM . If each ρm is rank one, in which case ρm can
be expressed as ρm = |ψm〉 〈ψm| for any m ∈ IM , then
Ψ = {ρm : m ∈ IM} (or Ψpure = {|ψm〉 : m ∈ IM}) is
referred to as a pure state set. Moreover, if {|ψm〉 : m ∈
IM} are linearly independent, then Ψ (or Ψpure) is called
a linearly independent pure state set.
Let H be the space spanned by {ρm : m ∈ IM}. Also,
let 1K be the identity operator on a Hilbert space K.
If there exists a unitary operator V on H such that
VM = 1H and ρm = V
mρ0V
−m for any m ∈ IM ,
then Ψ is referred to as a cyclic state set. In particu-
lar, if the pure state set Ψpure is cyclic, then there ex-
ists a unitary operator V on H such that VM = 1H
and |ψm〉 = V m |ψ0〉 for any m ∈ IM (when we choose
proper global phases). Cyclic states are special cases of
AGU states. We will give the definition of AGU states
in Appendix A2.
A quantum measurement that may return an incon-
clusive answer can be described by a positive operator-
valued measure (POVM) withM+1 detection operators,
Π = {Πm : m ∈ I?M}, where I?M is the set formed by
adding element ‘?′ to the set IM . The detection opera-
tor Πm with m ∈ IM corresponds to identification of the
state ρm, while Π? corresponds to the inconclusive an-
swer. An OIM is a measurement maximizing the average
correct probability under the constraint that the average
failure probability is p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) [16, 17, 27]; i.e., an
OIM is an optimal solution of the following problem:
maximize
∑
m∈IM
ξmTr(ρmΠm)
subject to
∑
m∈IM
ξmTr(ρmΠ?) = p.
(1)
A minimum error measurement is a special case of an
OIM, which satisfies p = 0. In this case, we can assume
without loss of generality that Π has M detection oper-
ators, i.e., Π = {Πm : m ∈ IM}, since Tr(ρmΠ?) = 0
holds for any m ∈ IM .
To realize an N -partite secure measurement with N ≥
2, we consider the procedure performed by N observers
and one receiver:
Step 1) The observers first perform an operation to-
gether to transform a given state ρm into a state
of their composite system, denoted by ρ′m.
Step 2) Each observer independently performs a mea-
surement on the state of his/her individual sub-
system.
Step 3) Each observer sends his/her outcome to the re-
ceiver via private classical communication.
Step 4) The receiver determines m from the observers’
outcomes.
Assume that in Step 1, which we call the preprocessing
step, the observers cannot perform a wrong or evil ac-
tion. In Step 2, dishonest observers may try to extract
information about m with wrong measurements. More-
over, if N ≥ 3, then N − 1 or fewer dishonest observers
may collaborate to get the information. We refer to a
measurement according to this procedure as anN -partite
secure measurement if any combined state of N − 1 or
fewer observers has absolutely no information about m,
or, equivalently, if any N−1 or fewer dishonest observers
get absolutely no information about m.
3III. REALIZING A MINIMUM-ERROR
MEASUREMENT
Let us begin by considering a minimum-error measure-
ment, and later extend it to an OIM.
Theorem 1 A minimum-error measurement for three
linearly independent cyclic pure states can be realized
with a bipartite secure measurement.
Proof Assume that Ψpure = {|ψm〉 : m ∈ I3} is a three
linearly independent pure state set. Also, assume that
Ψpure is cyclic; i.e., there exists a unitary operator V
on H such that V 3 = 1H and |ψm〉 = V m |ψ0〉 for any
m ∈ I3. Let Π(e) = {Π(e)m : m ∈ I3} be a POVM rep-
resenting a minimum-error measurement on H. Π(e) is
always projective, and rank Π
(e)
m = 1 holds [28], which
means that Π
(e)
m is expressed by Π
(e)
m = |π(e)m 〉 〈π(e)m | with
an orthonormal basis (ONB) {|π(e)m 〉 : m ∈ I3} in H.
Moreover, Π(e) is cyclic, i.e., |π(e)m 〉 = V m |π(e)0 〉 holds for
any m ∈ I3 [4].
We can see that a necessary and sufficient condition
for a bipartite secure measurement is that the candidate
states after preprocessing, {ρ′m : m ∈ I3}, satisfy
TrA ρ
′
j = TrA ρ
′
k, TrB ρ
′
j = TrB ρ
′
k, (2)
for any j, k ∈ I3, where TrA and TrB, respectively, rep-
resent the partial traces over Alice’s and Bob’s systems,
which implies that whether a given procedure is a bi-
partite secure measurement is determined only by the
preprocessing. Indeed, suppose by contradiction that
TrA ρ
′
j 6= TrA ρ′k holds for certain j, k ∈ I3; then, there
exists Bob’s measurement that gives some information
to distinguish ρ′j and ρ
′
k. It follows that, in order to ob-
tain a bipartite secure measurement that can realize the
minimum-error discrimination, we must consider a mea-
surement such that neither Alice nor Bob knows any in-
formation about the outcome obtained by Charlie. This
means that Alice’s measurement outcome must be inde-
pendent of Charlie’s outcome, and so must that of Bob.
To realize this, let us consider preprocessing that trans-
forms |π(e)m 〉, corresponding to Charlie’s outcome, into
|ηm〉 such that TrA |ηm〉 〈ηm| and TrB |ηm〉 〈ηm| are in-
dependent of m. To be concrete, let
|ηm〉 = 1√
3
2∑
k=0
|ak〉 |bm⊖k〉 , (3)
where ⊖ denotes the subtraction modulo 3, and {|am〉 :
m ∈ I3} and {|bm〉 : m ∈ I3} are ONBs in Alice’s
and Bob’s spaces, respectively. Such preprocessing can
be realized with the completely positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) map L(e)(X) = A(e)XA(e)† († denotes the con-
jugate transpose), where A(e) =
∑2
k=0 |ηk〉 〈π(e)k |. This
preprocessing turns the given state |ψm〉 into |ψ′m〉 =
A(e) |ψm〉. Now, we show that ρ′m = |ψ′m〉 〈ψ′m| satisfies
Eq. (2). Let χk = 〈π(e)k |ψ0〉; then, since {|π(e)m 〉} and
{|ψm〉} are cyclic, 〈π(e)k |ψm〉 = χk⊖m holds, which gives
|ψ′m〉 =
∑2
k=0 χk⊖m |ηk〉. Thus, from Eq. (3), we have
TrA ρ
′
m =
2∑
j,k,l=0
χj⊖mχ
∗
k⊖m
3
|bj⊖l〉 〈bk⊖l|
=
2∑
j′,k′,l′=0
χj′χ
∗
k′
3
|bj′⊖l′〉 〈bk′⊖l′ | , (4)
where j′ = j ⊖ m, k′ = k ⊖ m, and l′ = l ⊖ m. This
equation means that TrA ρ
′
m is independent of m. In
the same way, we can easily derive that TrB ρ
′
m is also
independent of m. Therefore, Eq. (2) holds.
The last thing we have to show is that the minimum-
error discrimination can be realized with only the local
operations to the state |ψ′m〉. Now, we consider the fol-
lowing procedure: Alice and Bob independently perform
measurements for |ψ′m〉 in the ONBs {|an〉} and {|bn〉},
and then send their outcomes j and k, corresponding to
|aj〉 and |bk〉, to Charlie, respectively. Charlie records
his result as j ⊕ k, where ⊕ is the addition modulo 3.
It follows that this procedure can be represented by the
POVM Φ(e) = {Φ(e)m : m ∈ I3} with
Φ(e)m =
2∑
k=0
|ak〉 〈ak| ⊗ |bm⊖k〉 〈bm⊖k| .
We obtain
〈ψ′m|Φ(e)n |ψ′m〉 =
2∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣∣〈ak| 〈bn⊖k|
2∑
t=0
χt⊖m |ηt〉
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= |χn⊖m|2 = 〈ψm|Π(e)n |ψm〉 , (5)
which indicates that this procedure can realize the
minimum-error discrimination. 
IV. REALIZING AN OPTIMAL
INCONCLUSIVE MEASUREMENT (OIM)
We extend the argument of Sec. III to an OIM in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2 An OIM with any average failure probabil-
ity for three linearly independent cyclic pure states can
be realized with a bipartite secure measurement.
Proof Let Ψpure = {|ψm〉 : m ∈ I3} be a set of three
linearly independent cyclic pure states. Also, let Π =
{Πm : m ∈ I?3} be an OIM on H for Ψpure. Πm (m ∈
I3) is rank one and thus can be expressed in the form
Πm = |πm〉 〈πm| [27]. In contrast, Π? is generally not
rank one. Assume without loss of generality that Π is
cyclic, i.e., |πm〉 = V m |π0〉 holds [27].
In the proof of Theorem 1, to realize a minimum-error
measurement with a bipartite secure measurement, we
exploited the fact that the POVM Π(e) is projective and
cyclic. We want to apply a similar approach to an OIM;
however, Π is generally non-projective. We consider, in-
stead of Π, an OIM that is projective and cyclic. Let
4Hex be a six-dimensional Hilbert space including H, and
Ω = {Ωm : m ∈ I?3} be a projective measurement on Hex
expressed as
Ωm = |ω(0)m 〉 〈ω(0)m | , m ∈ I3,
Ω? =
2∑
m=0
|ω(1)m 〉 〈ω(1)m | ,
where {|ω(s)m 〉 : m ∈ I3, s ∈ I2} is an ONB in Hex. Let
P be the orthogonal projection operator from Hex to
H. Assume that Ω is an OIM for Ψpure, which satis-
fies PΩmP
† = Πm for any m ∈ I?3 , and that for each
s ∈ I2, {P |ω(s)m 〉 : m ∈ I3} is cyclic, i.e., we have
P |ω(s)m 〉 = V mP |ω(s)0 〉 , m ∈ I3.
As will be described later, these assumptions hold if we
properly choose an ONB {|ω(s)m 〉}. Now, under these as-
sumptions, we show that a bipartite secure measurement
can realize an OIM for Ψpure.
First, we show preprocessing in which a bipartite se-
cure measurement is possible, i.e., Eq. (2) holds. Con-
sider that Alice and Bob perform the preprocessing rep-
resented by the CPTP map L(X) = AXA†, where
A =
1∑
s=0
2∑
m=0
|η(s)m 〉 〈ω(s)m | ,
|η(s)m 〉 =
1√
6
1∑
q=0
2∑
k=0
|a(q)k 〉 |b(q⋄s)m⊖k〉 , s ∈ I2,m ∈ I3.
⋄ is the addition modulo 2, and {|a(s)m 〉 : m ∈ I3, s ∈ I2}
and {|b(s)m 〉 : m ∈ I3, s ∈ I2} are ONBs in Alice’s and
Bob’s systems. Since {P |ω(s)m 〉} and {|ψm〉} are cyclic,
〈ω(s)k |ψm〉 = 〈ω(s)k⊖m|ψ0〉 holds. Thus, we can verify that
the state after preprocessing, |ψ′m〉 = A |ψm〉, satisfies
Eq. (2) in the same way as in Eq. (4).
Next, we show that an OIM can be realized with the
following procedure: Alice and Bob independently per-
form the measurements for the state |ψ′m〉 in the ONBs
{|a(s)m 〉} and {|b(s)m 〉} and send their outcomes (denoted
by |a(q)j 〉 and |b(s)k 〉) to Charlie, respectively. Charlie
records his result as j ⊕ k if q = s and “failure” other-
wise. This procedure can be represented by the POVM
Φ = {Φm : m ∈ I?3} with
Φm =
1∑
q=0
2∑
k=0
|a(q)k 〉 〈a(q)k | ⊗ |b(q)m⊖k〉 〈b(q)m⊖k| , m ∈ I3,
Φ? =
1∑
q=0
2∑
m,k=0
|a(q)k 〉 〈a(q)k | ⊗ |b(1⋄q)m⊖k〉 〈b(1⋄q)m⊖k | .
In a similar way to Eq. (5), we can easily verify that
〈ψ′m|Φk|ψ′m〉 = 〈ψm|Ωk|ψm〉. Therefore, this procedure
realizes an OIM.
Finally, we have to show that an ONB {|ω(s)m 〉} exists
such that Ω is an OIM for Ψpure and {P |ω(s)m 〉} is cyclic.
Let {|φm〉 : m ∈ I3} be an ONB in H such that the
Schatten decomposition of Π? is represented by Π? =∑2
k=0 λk |φk〉 〈φk|. We choose an ONB {|φ(s)m 〉 : m ∈I3, s ∈ I2} in Hex such that
P |φ(0)m 〉 =
√
1− λm |φm〉 ,
P |φ(1)m 〉 =
√
λm |φm〉 . (6)
This implies that the one-dimensional subspace
span(|φm〉) of H is associated with the two di-
mensional subspace span(|φ(0)m 〉 , |φ(1)m 〉) of Hex. Let
Fs =
∑2
k=0 |φ(s)k 〉 〈φk|, which is an isometric mapping
fromH to span(|φ(s)0 〉 , |φ(s)1 〉 , |φ(s)2 〉), and {|νm〉 : m ∈ I3}
be an ONB in H satisfying Λ |νm〉 = |πm〉, where
Λ = (1H −Π?)1/2 (such an ONB always exists [29]). We
choose |ω(s)m 〉 as |ω(0)m 〉 = F0 |νm〉 and |ω(1)m 〉 = F1 |π(e)m 〉,
where |π(e)m 〉 is a detection vector of the minimum-error
measurement Π(e). We show that {|ω(s)m 〉} is an ONB in
Hex that we sought. From Eq. (6) and the definition of
Fs, we can easily verify that PF0 = Λ and PF1 = Π
1/2
?
hold. The former equation yields
P |ω(0)m 〉 = PF0 |νm〉 = Λ |νm〉 = |πm〉 , (7)
which indicates PΩmP
† = Πm. Also, we have
PΩ?P
† = P
(
1Hex −
2∑
m=0
Ωm
)
P †
= 1H −
2∑
m=0
Πm = Π?,
which follows from PP † = 1H. Thus, Ω, as well as Π, is
an OIM. Moreover, {P |ω(s)m 〉} is cyclic for each s ∈ I2;
indeed, from Eq. (7),
P |ω(0)m 〉 = |πm〉 = V m |π0〉 = V mP |ω(0)0 〉 ,
and since V commutes with Π
1/2
? ,
P |ω(1)m 〉 = Π1/2? |π(e)m 〉 = V mΠ1/2? |π(e)0 〉 = V mP |ω(1)0 〉 .
This completes the proof. 
The proposed protocol for realizing an OIM is summa-
rized as follows: Alice and Bob first transform a given
state |ψm〉 into |ψ′m〉 by the preprocessing L. They next
perform measurements in the ONBs {|a(s)m 〉} and {|b(s)m 〉},
and send their outcomes to Charlie. The average failure
probability can be controlled by properly choosing the
ONB {|ω(s)m 〉}. In this discussion, we consider the pre-
processing L that transforms |ψm〉 into a generally en-
tangled state. We can also show that a bipartite secure
measurement that realizes an OIM exists such that ρ′m is
always separable (see Appendix A3b).
5V. MULTIPARTITE CASE
We consider extending this scenario to the multipar-
tite case. The more observers there are, the more diffi-
cult it can be for dishonest observer to steal the infor-
mation about m. Thus, it may be desirable to increase
the number of observers if the information must be kept
highly confidential. In the multipartite scenario, there
are N ≥ 3 observers and one receiver. Let us consider the
following protocol: N observers first share a given state
by preprocessing. After that, they independently per-
form measurements and send their results to the receiver.
We refer to the measurement as an N -partite secure mea-
surement if any combined state of N − 1 or fewer ob-
servers has absolutely no information about which state
was given. Here, we describe the case of N = 3 for three
linearly independent cyclic pure states. As a prepro-
cessing step, Alice, Bob, and Charlie transform ρm into
ρ′m = L(ρm) with the CPTP map LN (X) = ANXA†N ,
where
AN =
1∑
s=0
2∑
m=0
|η˜(s)m 〉 〈ω(s)m | ,
|η˜(s)m 〉 =
1
6
1∑
q1,q2=0
2∑
k1,k2=0
|a(q1)k1 〉 |b
(q2)
k2
〉 |c(q1⋄q2⋄s)m⊖k1⊖k2〉 .
{|c(s)m 〉 : m ∈ I3, s ∈ I2} is an ONB in Charlie’s sys-
tem. They independently perform measurements in the
ONBs {|a(s)m 〉}, {|b(s)m 〉}, and {|c(s)m 〉}, and send their out-
comes (denoted by |a(q)j 〉, |b(s)k 〉, and |c(r)l 〉) to Dave. Dave
records his result as j ⊕ k ⊕ l if q ⋄ s ⋄ r = 0 and “fail-
ure” otherwise. In a similar way to the bipartite case, we
can see that using this procedure, any OIM can be real-
ized with a tripartite secure measurement. We can show
that if possible candidate states are AGU, then any OIM
can be realized with an N -partite secure measurement
for any N ≥ 3 (proof in Appendix A4).
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have proposed a quantum measure-
ment scheme, called an N -partite secure measurement,
that enables confidential communication of classical mes-
sages via quantum channel. In our bipartite protocol,
Alice and Bob first share a quantum state obtained with
preprocessing. They next independently perform the
measurements, in which neither Alice nor Bob gets any
information about which state was given even if one does
anything wrong, and send their results to Charlie. We
stated that an OIM for any AGU state set can be realized
with an N -partite secure measurement.
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Appendix A: Extending to Abelian geometrically
uniform (AGU) states
In this section, we prove that any OIM for AGU states
can be realized with an N -partite secure measurement
for any N ≥ 2.
1. Outline
First, in Subsec. A 2, we provide definitions and a
lemma. Next, in Subsec. A 3, we consider a bipartite
secure measurement. We show that any OIM for AGU
states can be realized with a bipartite secure measure-
ment (Theorem 4). We also show that there exists such
a bipartite secure measurement in which a given state
is transformed into a separable state in a preprocessing
step. Finally, in Subsec. A 4, we extend Theorem 4 to
the multipartite case (Theorem 5).
2. Preliminaries
We consider a set ofM quantum states Ψ = {ρm : m ∈
G}, where G is an Abelian group with M elements. Let
e be the identity element of G. Assume that there exists
a set of M operators, {Um : m ∈ G}, in which Um is a
unitary or anti-unitary operator on H satisfying
Ue = 1H,
UmUk = Um◦k, m, k ∈ G, (A1)
and
UmρkU
†
m = ρm◦k, m, k ∈ G, (A2)
where m ◦ k is the multiplication of m and k, and U †m is
the operator satisfying U †mUm = UmU
†
m = 1H. Note that
if Um is an anti-unitary operator, then so is U
†
m. Such a
state set with equal prior probabilities is called an AGU
state set [18–20]. In particular, if G is cyclic, then Ψ is
referred to as a cyclic state set.
A quantum measurement for Ψ that may return an
inconclusive answer can be described by a POVM Π =
{Πm : m ∈ G?}, where G? is the set (which is not a
group) formed by adding element ‘?′ to G. The detection
operator Πm with m ∈ G corresponds to identification of
the state ρm, while Π? corresponds to the inconclusive
answer.
For a given set of unitary or anti-unitary operators
{Um : m ∈ G} on H satisfying Eq. (A1), we say a set of
6vectors {|am〉 : m ∈ G} of H is AGU if
|am◦k〉 = Um |ak〉 , m, k ∈ G. (A3)
Let R = rank ρm, which is independent of m when Ψ is
AGU. It follows that there exist vectors {|ψm,r〉 : m ∈
G, r ∈ IR} such that
ρm =
∑
r∈IR
|ψm,r〉 〈ψm,r| , m ∈ G,
|ψm◦k,r〉 = Um |ψk,r〉 , m, k ∈ G, r ∈ IR, (A4)
i.e., {|ψm,r〉 : m ∈ G} is AGU for any r ∈ IR. In-
deed, if we choose {|ψe,r〉 : r ∈ IR} such that ρe =∑
r∈IR
|ψe,r〉 〈ψe,r| and let |ψm,r〉 = Um |ψe,r〉, then
Eq. (A4) holds.
The following lemma shows that any OIM for AGU
states can be expressed as a projection valued measure
(PVM) with certain symmetries (proof in Appendix B).
Lemma 3 We consider a PVM Ω = {Ωm : m ∈ G?}
on a 2MR-dimensional Hilbert space (denoted by Hex)
satisfying Hex ⊇ H. Assume that Ωm is expressed as
Ωm =
∑
r∈IR
|ω(0)m,r〉 〈ω(0)m,r| , m ∈ G,
Ω? =
∑
m∈G
∑
r∈IR
|ω(1)m,r〉 〈ω(1)m,r| , (A5)
where {|ω(s)m,r〉 : s ∈ I2,m ∈ G, r ∈ IR} is an ONB in Hex.
For any p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, there exists an ONB {|ω(s)m,r〉}
such that
P |ω(s)m◦k,r〉 = UmP |ω(s)k,r〉 , k,m ∈ G, s ∈ I2, r ∈ IR
(A6)
holds (i.e., {P |ω(s)m,r〉 : m ∈ G} is AGU for any s ∈ I2
and r ∈ IR) and Ω is an OIM, with the average failure
probability of p, for Ψ.
3. Bipartite secure measurement for AGU states
a. Realization of an OIM
In Theorem 2, we showed that any OIM for three lin-
early independent cyclic pure states can be realized with
a bipartite secure measurement. Here, we extend this
result as follows:
Theorem 4 An OIM, with any average failure probabil-
ity, for AGU states can be realized with a bipartite secure
measurement.
Proof Let us consider an AGU state set Ψ = {ρm : m ∈
G}. Also, let Ω and {|ω(s)m,r〉} be the OIM for Ψ and the
ONB obtained by Lemma 3, respectively. Consider that
two observers, Alice and Bob, perform the preprocessing
represented by the completely positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) map L(X) = AXA†, where
A =
∑
q∈I2
∑
k∈G
∑
r∈IR
|η(q)k,r〉 〈ω(q)k,r| ,
|η(q)k,r〉 =
1√
2M
∑
s∈I2
∑
t∈G
|a(s)t,r 〉 |b(q⋄s)t◦k,r〉 , (A7)
m is the inverse element of m, and ⋄ is the addition
modulo 2. {|a(s)m,r〉 : s ∈ I2,m ∈ G, r ∈ IR} and
{|b(s)m,r〉 : s ∈ I2,m ∈ G, r ∈ IR} are, respectively, ONBs
in Alice’s and Bob’s systems, each of which is 2MR-
dimensional. Let |ψ′m,r〉 = A |ψm,r〉. This map trans-
forms |ψm,r〉 into |ψ′m,r〉, and thus ρ′m = L(ρm) is ex-
pressed by
ρ′m =
∑
r∈IR
|ψ′m,r〉 〈ψ′m,r| . (A8)
We show that a bipartite secure measurement can be
realized with the preprocessing L and that an OIM can
be realized with measurements, independently performed
by Alice and Bob, for the state ρ′m.
First, we show that a bipartite secure measurement
can be realized. A necessary and sufficient condition for
a bipartite secure measurement is that for any j, k ∈ G,
{ρ′m : m ∈ G} satisfies
TrA ρ
′
j = TrA ρ
′
k, TrB ρ
′
j = TrB ρ
′
k, (A9)
where TrA and TrB are the partial traces over Alice’s
and Bob’s systems, respectively. Thus, it suffices to show
Eq. (A9). Let χ
(s)
k,r,r′ = 〈ω(s)k,r|ψe,r′〉 /
√
2M ; then, we have
〈ω(s)k,r|ψm,r′〉 = 〈ω(s)m◦k,r|P †U †mUm|ψe,r′〉
= 〈ω(s)m◦k,r|ψe,r′〉 =
√
2Mχ
(s)
m◦k,r,r′ , (A10)
where the first line follows from Eqs. (A4) and (A6) (i.e.,
both {|ψm,r〉 : m ∈ G} and {P |ω(s)m,r〉 : m ∈ G} are AGU).
Thus, from Eq. (A7), we obtain
|ψ′m,r′〉 = A |ψm,r′〉 =
√
2M
∑
q∈I2
∑
k∈G
∑
r∈IR
χ
(q)
m◦k,r,r′ |η(q)k,r〉
=
√
2M
∑
q∈I2
∑
k′∈G
∑
r∈IR
χ
(q)
k′,r,r′ |η(q)m◦k′,r〉 , (A11)
where k′ = m ◦ k. In contrast, from Eq. (A7), we have
TrA |η(q)m◦k′,r〉 〈η(u)m◦l′,r|
=
1
2M
TrA
[∑
s∈I2
∑
t∈G
|a(s)m◦t,r〉 |b(q⋄s)t◦k′,r〉 〈a
(s)
m◦t,r| 〈b(u⋄s)t◦l′,r |
]
=
1
2M
∑
s∈I2
∑
t∈G
|b(q⋄s)
t◦k′,r
〉 〈b(u⋄s)
t◦l′,r
| , (A12)
which means that TrA |η(q)m◦k′,r〉 〈η(u)m◦l′,r| is independent
of m. Therefore, from Eq. (A11), TrA |ψ′m,r′〉 〈ψ′m,r′ |
7is independent of m, and thus so is TrA ρ
′
m =
TrA
∑
r′∈IR
|ψ′m,r′〉 〈ψ′m,r′ |. Similarly, from
TrB |η(q)m◦k′,r〉 〈η(u)m◦l′,r|
=
1
2M
TrB
[∑
s∈I2
∑
t∈G
|a(q⋄s)k′◦t,r〉 |b(s)t◦m,r〉 〈a
(u⋄s)
l′◦t,r | 〈b(s)t◦m,r|
]
=
1
2M
∑
s∈I2
∑
t∈G
|a(q⋄s)k′◦t,r〉 〈a(u⋄s)l′◦t,r | , (A13)
we can easily derive that TrB ρ
′
m is also independent of
m. Therefore, Eq. (A9) holds.
Next, we show that an OIM can be realized with only
the local operations to the state ρ′m. We consider the fol-
lowing procedure: Alice and Bob independently perform
measurements in the ONBs {|a(s)m,r〉} and {|b(s)m,r〉}, respec-
tively, and send their outcomes, denoted by |a(s)t,r 〉 and
|b(q)l,r′〉, to the receiver, Charlie. Note that from Eq. (A7),
r = r′ always holds. Charlie records his result as t ◦ l,
which corresponds to |ψt◦l〉, if s = q and “failure” oth-
erwise. It follows that this procedure can be represented
by the POVM Π′ = {Π′m : m ∈ G?} with
Π′k =
∑
s∈I2
∑
t∈G
∑
r∈IR
|a(s)t,r 〉 〈a(s)t,r | ⊗ |b(s)t◦k,r〉 〈b
(s)
t◦k,r
| (A14)
for each k ∈ G and
Π′? =
∑
s∈I2
∑
t,k∈G
∑
r∈IR
|a(s)t,r 〉 〈a(s)t,r | ⊗ |b(1⋄s)t◦k,r〉 〈b
(1⋄s)
t◦k,r
| . (A15)
From Eqs. (A7) and (A14), for any q, s ∈ I2, k, t, l ∈ G,
and r′ ∈ IR, we have
〈η(q)t,r |Π′k|η(s)l,r′〉 = δq,0δs,0δt,kδl,kδr,r′ , (A16)
where δa,b is the Kronecker delta. Thus, from Eq. (A11),
for any k,m ∈ G and r′ ∈ IR, we have
〈ψ′m,r′ |Π′k|ψ′m,r′〉 = 2M
∑
r∈IR
|χ(0)m◦k,r,r′ |2
= 〈ψm,r′ |Ωk|ψm,r′〉 , (A17)
where the second line follows from Eqs. (A5) and (A10).
This gives
Tr(ρ′mΠ
′
k) =
∑
r′∈IR
〈ψ′m,r′ |Π′k|ψ′m,r′〉
=
∑
r′∈IR
〈ψm,r′ |Ωk|ψm,r′〉 = Tr(ρmΩk),
Tr(ρ′mΠ
′
?) = 1−
∑
k∈G
Tr(ρ′mΠ
′
k)
= 1−
∑
k∈G
Tr(ρmΩk) = Tr(ρmΩ?), (A18)
which indicates that the average correct and failure prob-
abilities of Π′ for Ψ′ are identical to those of Ω for Ψ,
respectively. Therefore, this procedure realizes an OIM.

b. Preprocessing for returning a separable state
Here, we show that an OIM can be realized with a bi-
partite secure measurement even if Alice and Bob use the
following CPTP map, instead of L, in the preprocessing
step:
Lsep(X) =
∑
s∈I2
∑
k∈G
∑
r∈IR
A
(s)
k,rXA
(s)†
k,r ,
A
(s)
k,r =
1√
2M
|a(s)k,r〉
∑
q∈I2
∑
j∈G
|b(q⋄s)
k◦j,r
〉 〈ω(q)j,r | .(A19)
Lsep is a CPTP map since∑
s∈I2
∑
k∈G
∑
r∈IR
A
(s)†
k,r A
(s)
k,r
=
1
2M
∑
s,q∈I2
∑
j,k∈G
∑
r∈IR
|ω(q)j,r 〉 〈ω(q)j,r |
=
∑
q∈I2
∑
j∈G
∑
r∈IR
|ω(q)j,r 〉 〈ω(q)j,r | = 1Hex . (A20)
ρ′m = Lsep(ρm) is a mixed state, even if ρm is a pure state,
but is always a separable state; indeed, from Eq. (A19),
we have
ρ′m =
∑
s∈I2
∑
k∈G
∑
r∈IR
A
(s)
k,rρmA
(s)†
k,r ,
=
∑
s,q,q′∈I2
∑
k,j,j′∈G
∑
r,t∈IR
χ
(q)
m◦j,r,tχ
(q′)∗
m◦j′,r,t
× |a(s)k,r〉 〈a(s)k,r| ⊗ |b(q⋄s)k◦j,r〉 〈b
(q′⋄s)
k◦j′,r
|
=
∑
s∈I2
∑
k,j,j′∈G
∑
r∈IR
|a(s)k,r〉 〈a(s)k,r|
⊗
∑
t∈IR
|γ(s)m,k,r,t〉 〈γ(s)m,k,r,t| , (A21)
where
|γ(s)m,k,r,t〉 =
∑
q∈I2
∑
j∈G
χ
(q)
m◦j,r,t |b(q⋄s)k◦j,r〉 . (A22)
We show that an OIM can be realized with a bipartite
secure measurement using Lsep.
First, we show that a bipartite secure measurement
can be realized, i.e., Eq. (A9) holds. We have
TrA ρ
′
m =
∑
s,q,q′∈I2
∑
k,j,j′∈G
∑
r,t∈IR
χ
(q)
m◦j,r,tχ
(q′)∗
m◦j′,r,t
× |b(q⋄s)
k◦j,r
〉 〈b(q′⋄s)
k◦j′,r
|
=
∑
s,q,q′∈I2
∑
κ,ι,ι′∈G
∑
r,t∈IR
χ
(q)
ι,r,tχ
(q′)∗
ι′,r,t
× |b(q⋄s)κ◦ι,r〉 〈b(q
′⋄s)
κ◦ι′,r| ,
TrB ρ
′
m =
∑
s,q∈I2
∑
k,j∈G
∑
r,t∈IR
|χ(q)m◦j,r,t|2 |a(s)k,r〉 〈a(s)k,r|
=
∑
s,q∈I2
∑
k,ι∈G
∑
r,t∈IR
|χ(q)ι,r,t|2 |a(s)k,r〉 〈a(s)k,r | ,(A23)
8where κ = m◦k, ι = m◦j, and ι′ = m◦j′. Thus, TrA ρ′m
and TrB ρ
′
m are independent of m, i.e., Eq. (A9) holds.
Next, we show that an OIM can be realized with the
procedure that is the same as in the proof of Theorem 4,
except for the preprocessing step. The procedure after
preprocessing is represented by the POVM Π′ satisfying
Eqs. (A14) and (A15). From Eqs. (A14) and (A21), we
have
Tr(ρ′mΠ
′
k) = 2M
∑
r,t∈IR
|χ(0)m◦k,r,t|2 = Tr(ρmΩk), (A24)
and thus Eq. (A18) holds. Therefore, Π′ is an OIM for
{ρ′m = Lsep(ρm)}.
4. Multipartite secure measurement for AGU
states
In this section, we extend Theorem 4 to a multipartite
secure measurement.
Theorem 5 For any N with N ≥ 2, an OIM, with any
average failure probability, for AGU states can be real-
ized with an N -partite secure measurement.
Proof In preparation, let us represent the preprocessing
performed by N observers as the CPTP map L. Consider
an AGU state set Ψ = {ρm : m ∈ G}. Let Ω and {|ω(s)m,r〉}
be the OIM for Ψ and the ONB obtained by Lemma 3,
respectively. Also, let Sq be the entire set of a collection
of N elements of I2, denoted by s = (s0, s1, · · · , sN−1),
satisfying s0 ⋄ s1 ⋄ · · · ⋄ sN−1 = q, and Gk be the en-
tire set of a collection of N elements of G, denoted by
t = (t0, t1, · · · , tN−1), satisfying t0 ◦ t1 ◦ · · · ◦ tN−1 = k.
Assume that L can be expressed by L(X) = AXA† with
A =
∑
q∈I2
∑
k∈G
∑
r∈IR
|η(q)k,r〉 〈ω(q)k,r| ,
|η(q)k,r〉 =
1
C
∑
s∈Sq
∑
t∈Gk
(⊗
n∈IN
|µ(sn)tn,r 〉n
)
, (A25)
and C = (2M)(N−1)/2. For each n ∈ IN , {|µ(s)m,r〉n :
s ∈ I2,m ∈ G, r ∈ IR} denotes an ONB in the 2MR-
dimensional system of the n-th observer. Here, we
rewrite |η(q)k,r〉 of Eq. (A25) in yet another form. Let GN−1
be the entire set of a collection of N − 1 elements of G.
For each n, ν ∈ IN , τ = (τ0, · · · , τN−2) ∈ GN−1, and
k ∈ G, let tn,ν(τ, k) ∈ G be
tn,ν(τ, k) = τn−1 ◦ kn,ν ◦ τn, (A26)
where kn,ν = k if n = ν and kn,ν = e otherwise, and
τ−1 = τN−1 = e. For example, in the case of N =
3 and ν = 1, t0,ν(τ, k) = τ0, t1,ν(τ, k) = τ0 ◦ k ◦ τ1,
and t2,ν(τ, k) = τ1. Here, for a fixed ν ∈ IN , let t =
(t0,ν(τ, k), · · · , tN−1,ν(τ, k)) for a given τ ∈ GN−1 and
k ∈ G; then,
t0 ◦ · · · ◦ tN−1 = t0,ν(τ, k) ◦ · · · ◦ tN−1,ν(τ, k)
= k, (A27)
i.e., t ∈ Gk, always holds from Eq. (A26). This implies
that for a fixed k ∈ G, the elements of GN−1, τ , are
in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of Gk, t.
Thus, for any ν ∈ IN , |η(q)k,r〉 can be rewritten as
|η(q)k,r〉 =
1
C
∑
s∈Sq
∑
τ∈GN−1
(⊗
n∈IN
|µ(sn)tn,ν(τ,k),r〉n
)
. (A28)
We can prove this theorem in a similar way as Theo-
rem 4. We first show that an N -partite secure measure-
ment can be realized with the preprocessing L and next
show that an OIM can be realized with measurements,
independently performed by N observers, for the state
ρ′m = L(ρm).
First, we show that an N -partite secure measurement
can be realized. It suffices to show that for any ν ∈ IN ,
{ρ′m : m ∈ G} satisfies
Trν ρ
′
j = Trν ρ
′
k, (A29)
where Trν is the partial trace over the system of the ν-th
observer. Let χ
(s)
k,r,r′ = 〈ω(s)k,r|ψe,r′〉 /C; then we have
〈ω(s)k,r|ψm,r′〉 = 〈ω(s)m◦k,r|P †U †mUm|ψe,r′〉
= 〈ω(s)m◦k,r|ψe,r′〉 = Cχ(s)m◦k,r,r′ . (A30)
Equations (A25) and (A30) yield
|ψ′m,r′〉 = A |ψm,r′〉
= C
∑
q∈I2
∑
k∈G
∑
r∈IR
χ
(q)
m◦k,r,r′ |η(q)k,r〉
= C
∑
q∈I2
∑
k′∈G
∑
r∈IR
χ
(q)
k′,r,r′ |η(q)m◦k′,r〉 , (A31)
where k′ = m ◦ k. In contrast, Eq. (A28) yields
Trν |η(q)m◦k′,r〉 〈η(u)m◦l′,r|
=
1
C2
Trν
[∑
s∈Sq
∑
τ∈GN−1
(⊗
n∈IN
|µ(sn)tn,ν(τ,m◦k′),r〉n
)
×
∑
s′∈Su
∑
τ ′∈GN−1
(⊗
n∈IN
〈µ(s′n)tn,ν(τ ′,m◦l′),r|n
)]
=
1
C2
∑
s∈Sq
∑
s′∈Su
∑
τ,τ ′∈GN−1
ǫ(τ, τ ′,m ◦ k′,m ◦ l′)
×

⊗
n∈IN
n6=ν
|µ(sn)tn,ν(τ,m◦k′),r〉 〈µ
(s′n)
tn,ν(τ ′,m◦l′),r
|
n

 ,(A32)
where
ǫ(τ, τ ′,m ◦ k′,m ◦ l′) =
{
1, tν,ν(τ, k
′) = tν,ν(τ
′, l′),
0, otherwise.
(A33)
We should note that tν,ν(τ, k
′) = tν,ν(τ
′, l′) in Eq. (A33)
is equivalent to tν,ν(τ,m ◦ k′) = tν,ν(τ ′,m ◦ l′), since G is
9Abelian. Since tn,ν(τ,m ◦ k′) is independent of m when-
ever n 6= ν, which follows from Eq. (A26), and ǫ(τ, τ ′,m◦
k′,m◦ l′) is also independent of m, the right-hand side of
the last equality of Eq. (A32) is independent ofm. Thus,
from Eq. (A31), Trν |ψ′m,r′〉 〈ψ′m,r′ | is independent of m.
Therefore, Trν ρ
′
m = Trν
∑
r′∈IR
|ψ′m,r′〉 〈ψ′m,r′ | is also
independent of m, which means that Eq. (A29) holds for
any ν ∈ IN .
Next, we show that an OIM can be realized with mea-
surements, independently performed by N observers, for
the state ρ′m. We consider the following procedure: For
each n ∈ IN , the n-th observer independently performs
the measurement in the ONB {|µ(sn)tn,rn〉n : sn ∈ I2, tn ∈G, rn ∈ IR} and sends his/her outcome (denoted by
|µ(sn)tn,rn〉n) to the receiver (note that from Eq. (A25), r0 =
r1 = · · · = rN−1 always holds). Let k = t0◦t1◦· · ·◦tN−1.
The receiver records his/her result as k, which corre-
sponds to |ψk〉, if s0⋄s1⋄· · ·⋄sN−1 = 0 and “failure” oth-
erwise. This procedure can be represented by the POVM
Π′ = {Π′m : m ∈ G?} with
Π′k =
∑
s∈S0
∑
t∈Gk
∑
r∈IR
(⊗
n∈IN
|µ(sn)tn,r 〉 〈µ
(sn)
tn,r |n
)
(A34)
for each k ∈ G and
Π′? =
∑
s∈S1
∑
k∈G
∑
t∈Gk
∑
r∈IR
(⊗
n∈IN
|µ(sn)tn,r 〉 〈µ
(sn)
tn,r |n
)
. (A35)
From Eqs. (A25) and (A34), for any q, s ∈ I2, k, t, l ∈ G,
and r′ ∈ IR, we have
〈η(q)t,r |Π′k|η(s)l,r′〉 = δq,0δs,0δt,kδl,kδr,r′ , (A36)
and thus, from Eq. (A31), for any k,m ∈ G and r′ ∈ IR,
we have
〈ψ′m,r′ |Π′k|ψ′m,r′〉 = C2
∑
r∈IR
|χ(0)m◦k,r,r′ |2
= 〈ψm,r′ |Ωk|ψm,r′〉 , (A37)
where the second line follows from Eq. (A30). Thus, we
have
Tr(ρ′mΠ
′
k) =
∑
r′∈IR
〈ψ′m,r′ |Π′k|ψ′m,r′〉
=
∑
r′∈IR
〈ψm,r′ |Ωk|ψm,r′〉 = Tr(ρmΩk),
Tr(ρ′mΠ
′
?) = 1−
∑
k∈G
Tr(ρ′mΠ
′
k)
= 1−
∑
k∈G
Tr(ρmΩk) = Tr(ρmΩ?), (A38)
which indicates that the average correct and failure prob-
abilities of Π′ for Ψ′ are identical to those of Ω for Ψ,
respectively. Therefore, this procedure realizes an OIM.

Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 3
1. Preparations
Before we provide the proof, we provide definitions and
facts. Let Π = {Πm : m ∈ G?} be an OIM on H, with the
average failure probability of p, for Ψ. From Refs. [19,
27], we can assume without loss of generality that
Πm◦k = UmΠkU
†
m, m, k ∈ G,
Π? = UmΠ?U
†
m, m ∈ G. (B1)
We can choose proper vectors {|πm,r〉 : m ∈ G, r ∈ IR}
such that
Πm =
∑
r∈IR
|πm,r〉 〈πm,r| , m ∈ G,
|πm◦k,r〉 = Um |πk,r〉 , m, k ∈ G. (B2)
Indeed, if we choose {|πe,r〉 : r ∈ IR} such that
Πe =
∑
r∈IR
|πe,r〉 〈πe,r | and let |πm,r〉 = Um |πe,r〉, then
Eq. (B2) holds. Let D = dim H and H1 be an MR-
dimensional Hilbert space satisfying H ⊆ H1 ⊆ Hex. H1
always exists since D ≤MR < 2MR holds, and H1 = H
obviously holds if D =MR. Also, let Λ = (1H −Π?)1/2;
then the Schatten decomposition of Λ can be represented
by
Λ =
∑
d∈IMR
√
1− λd |φd〉 〈φd| , (B3)
where {|φd〉 : d ∈ IMR} is an ONB in H1. Let HΛ =
supp Λ. Since HΛ ⊆ H holds, we assume without loss of
generality that {|φd〉 : d ∈ ID} spans the space H, and
thus, λd = 1 holds for any d with D ≤ d < MR. P is
expressed by
P =
∑
d∈ID
|φd〉 〈φd| . (B4)
Now, we show that there exist two ONBs {|v(0)m,r〉 : m ∈
G, r ∈ IR} and {|v(1)m,r〉 : m ∈ G, r ∈ IR} in H1 such that
Λ |v(0)m,r〉 = |πm,r〉 , m ∈ G, r ∈ IR, (B5)
P |v(1)m◦k,r〉 = UmP |v(1)k,r〉 , m, k ∈ G, r ∈ IR. (B6)
First, we show an ONB {|v(0)m,r〉} satisfying Eq. (B5). Let
|π′m,r〉 = Λ+ |πm,r〉 (Λ+ is the Moore-Penrose inverse of
Λ); then from Eq. (B2), we obtain
∑
m∈G
∑
r∈IR
|π′m,r〉 〈π′m,r| = Λ+
(∑
m∈G
Πm
)
Λ+
= Λ+Λ2Λ+ = 1HΛ . (B7)
Thus, {|π′m,r〉 〈π′m,r| : m ∈ G, r ∈ IR} is a POVM on HΛ.
From Naimark’s theorem, there exists an ONB, denoted
by {|v(0)m,r〉}, in H1 such that PΛ |v(0)m,r〉 = |π′m,r〉 [30],
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where PΛ is the orthogonal projection operator from H1
to HΛ. It follows that, for any m ∈ G and r ∈ IR,
Λ |v(0)m,r〉 = Λ |π′m,r〉 = |πm,r〉 , (B8)
i.e., Eq. (B5) holds. Next, we show an ONB {|v(1)m,r〉}
satisfying Eq. (B6). Let Π(e) = {Π(e)m : m ∈ G} be a
minimum-error measurement on H for Ψ. Let us choose
|π(e)m,r〉 such that
Π(e)m =
∑
r∈IR
|π(e)m,r〉 〈π(e)m,r| , m ∈ G,
|π(e)m◦k,r〉 = Um |π(e)k,r〉 , m, k ∈ G. (B9)
In the same manner as in Eq. (B2), we can always choose
such |π(e)m,r〉. From Naimark’s theorem, there exists an
ONB, denoted by {|v(1)m,r〉}, in H1 such that P |v(1)m,r〉 =
|π(e)m,r〉. Thus,
P |v(1)m◦k,r〉 = |π(e)m◦k,r〉 = Um |π(e)k,r〉 = UmP |v(1)k,r〉 ,
(B10)
i.e., Eq. (B6) holds.
2. Derivation of {|ω
(s)
m,r〉}
Let us remind that Hex is a 2MR-dimensional Hilbert
space satisfying Hex ⊇ H1. We choose an ONB {|φ(s)d 〉 :
s ∈ I2, d ∈ IMR} in Hex such that for any d ∈ IMR,
P1 |φ(0)d 〉 =
√
1− λd |φd〉 ,
P1 |φ(1)d 〉 =
√
λd |φd〉 , (B11)
where P1 is the orthogonal projection operator from Hex
to H1. This implies that the one-dimensional subspace
span(|φd〉) of H1 is associated with the two-dimensional
subspace span(|φ(0)d 〉 , |φ(1)d 〉) of Hex. We define |ω(s)m,r〉 as
|ω(s)m,r〉 = Fs |v(s)m,r〉 , s ∈ I2,m ∈ G, r ∈ IR,
Fs =
∑
d∈IMR
|φ(s)d 〉 〈φd| , s ∈ I2. (B12)
We can easily verify that {|ω(s)m,r〉 : s ∈ I2,m ∈ G, r ∈ IR}
is an ONB in Hex. Indeed, we obtain
〈ω(s)m,r|ω(s)m′,r′〉 = 〈v(s)m,r|v(s)m′,r′〉 = δm,m′δr,r′, (B13)
where δa,b is the Kronecker delta, which follows from Fs
being an isometric mapping, and 〈ω(0)m,r|ω(1)m′,r′〉 = 0 holds
from F †0F1 = 0.
Let us consider the PVM Ω defined by Eq. (A5) with
this ONB {|ω(s)m,r〉}. We will prove that Ω is an OIM,
with the average failure probability of p, for Ψ and that
Eq. (A6) holds.
3. Proof of Ω to be an OIM
Here, we show that Ω is an OIM, with the average
failure probability of p, for Ψ. From Eqs. (B3), (B4),
(B11), and (B12), we have
PF0 =
∑
d∈ID
∑
j∈IMR
|φd〉 〈φd|φ(0)j 〉 〈φj |
=
∑
d∈ID
√
1− λd |φd〉 〈φd| = Λ,
PF1 =
∑
d∈ID
√
λd |φd〉 〈φd| = (1H − Λ2)1/2 = Π1/2? .
(B14)
From Eqs. (B5), (B12), and (B14), for any m ∈ G and
r ∈ IR, we have
P |ω(0)m,r〉 = Λ |v(0)m,r〉 = |πm,r〉 , (B15)
which gives PΩmP
† = Πm for any m ∈ G. Also, we have
PΩ?P
† = P
(
1Hex −
∑
m∈G
Ωm
)
P †
= 1H −
∑
m∈G
Πm = Π?. (B16)
Therefore, Ω is an optimal solution of problem (1) as
well as Π, i.e., Ω is an OIM, with the average failure
probability of p, for Ψ.
4. Proof of Eq. (A6)
Here, we show Eq. (A6). From Eqs. (B2) and (B15),
for any m, k ∈ G and r ∈ IR, we have
P |ω(0)m◦k,r〉 = |πm◦k,r〉 = Um |πk,r〉 = UmP |ω(0)k,r〉 .
(B17)
Moreover, from Eqs. (B6), (B12), and (B14), for any
m, k ∈ G, r ∈ IR, we have
P |ω(1)m◦k,r〉 = Π1/2? |v(1)m◦k,r〉 = Π1/2? P |v(1)m◦k,r〉
= Π
1/2
? UmP |v(1)k,r〉 = UmΠ1/2? |v(1)k,r〉
= UmP |ω(1)k,r〉 , (B18)
where the fourth equality follows since Π
1/2
? commutes
with Um from Eq. (B1). Therefore, Eq. (A6) holds. 
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